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Abstract 
In a supplementary note to Ghosh and Morita ("Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis," 2007, 
IJIO), an example has been used to show that the condition for insufficient entry holds under the right-to-manage 
model of a vertically related industry. Using a linear demand curve, this note makes it clear that excessive entry rather 
than insufficient entry is quite common under a right-to-manage model, and shows that excessive entry occurs if the 
cost of entry is not very high.
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Ghosh and Morita (2007a) show that, in the case of a bilateral oligopoly with 
“efficient bargaining”, entry is always insufficient if the suppliers of the intermediate 
products have sufficiently high bargaining power.
1 In a supplementary note to that 
paper, they used a numerical example to show that the condition for insufficient entry 
would hold under a “right-to-manage” model of a vertically related industry. 
However, since they were interested in insufficient entry, they did not pay much 
attention to show how likely it was to have insufficient entry under a right-to-manage 
model. Using a linear demand curve, we show that the occurrence of excessive entry 
rather than insufficient entry is quite common under a right-to-manage model. Unless 
the cost of entry is very high, entry is socially excessive rather than insufficient. Thus, 
we make the role of the entry cost clear in determining excessive or insufficient entry.   
 
2. The model and the results 
 
Let us consider an industry with a large number of symmetric downstream firms, each 
of whom must decide whether or not to enter the downstream sector. In the case of 
entry, each downstream firm needs to incur an entry cost K . If n downstream firms 
enter, each of them is paired with an upstream firm. The upstream firms provide 
inputs to the respective downstream firms. We assume that the upstream firms have 
full bargaining power and determine the input prices. The respective downstream 
firms purchase the inputs according to their requirements. The downstream firms 
transform the inputs to a final homogeneous good with a constant marginal cost, 
which is normalized to zero. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of producing the 
input is zero. We also assume that the downstream firms have symmetric production 
technology, and each downstream firm requires one input to produce one unit of 
output. It is worth mentioning that a downstream firm can use only the inputs 
produced by the upstream firm which is paired with this downstream firm.  
We assume that the inverse market demand function is  
  q a P − = ,           ( 1 )  
where the notations have usual meanings. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the downstream firms decide 
whether or not to enter the industry. At stage 2, the upstream firm set the input prices 
simultaneously for the respective downstream firms. At stage 3, the downstream firms 
compete like Cournot oligopolists to determine their equilibrium outputs, and buy the 
inputs according to their requirements. The profits are realized. We solve the game 
through backward induction.  
Given that n downstream firms have entered and the ith upstream firm, 
n i ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  charged  i w  as the per-unit price for its input, the ith downstream firm, 
n i ,..., 2 , 1 = , maximizes the following expression to determine its output: 
  K q w q a Max i i
qi
− − − ) ( .        ( 2 )  








  The equilibrium output of the ith downstream firm is 
                                                 
1 In another paper, Ghosh and Morita (2007b) show insufficient entry in a vertical structure, where the 


















i ,   n i ,..., 2 , 1 = .       ( 3 )  
Since each downstream firm requires one input to produce one unit of output, (3) also 
shows the input demand faced by the ith upstream firm,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The ith 

















,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = .       ( 4 )  










w w w n . As the number of firms in the downstream sector increases, it 
reduces the equilibrium input price. 
  The equilibrium net profit of the ith downstream firm which has decided to 










π .          ( 5 )  
For the analytical convenience, we consider the number of firms as a 
continuous variable. Hence, entry in the downstream sector occurs until the net profit 
of a new entrant is zero. Given the symmetry of the firms, the free entry equilibrium 
number of firms in the downstream sector is given by the zero profit condition: 









.           ( 6 )  
Given K, condition (6) shows the number of firms entering the downstream sector in 
the free entry equilibrium. It follows from (6) that, if the cost of entry (i.e., K ) falls, 
the number of firms in the free entry equilibrium increases. 
  Now determine the welfare maximizing number of firms, where welfare is 
given by the sum of the total net profits of the downstream firms, the total profits of 
the upstream firms and consumer surplus. Following the literature on excess-entry 
theorem, we consider the second-best problem of welfare maximization. That is, we 
determine welfare maximizing number of firms subject to Cournot behavior of the 
firms. Hence, the social planner can control the number of firms entering the 
downstream sector, but it cannot control the output choice behavior of the firms. 
 If  n downstream firms produce, it follows from (5) that the net profit of the i









π ,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The total net profit of the 










π .          ( 7 )  3 
 










w w w n , the 
equilibrium amount of input supplied by the ith upstream firm is 





n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The profit of the ith upstream firm is 
3
2




Ui ,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The 
total profit of the upstream firms is 
3
2 2




nUi .          ( 8 )  
Since the total final goods production is 
2
2
















CS .          ( 9 )  
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.                        (11) 
It follows from (11) that as the cost of entry (i.e., K ) falls, the welfare maximizing 
number of firms increases. 
 
Proposition 1: (i) The welfare maximizing number of firms is lower than the number 
of firms in the free entry equilibrium, if the welfare maximizing number of firm is at 
least 4. In this situation, entry is excessive from the social point of view. 
(ii) If the welfare maximizing number of firm is at most 3, the number of firms in the 
free entry equilibrium is lower than the welfare maximizing number of firms, and 
entry is insufficient in this situation.
2 
Proof: Assume that (11) holds, i.e., we determine the welfare maximizing number of 
firms. Comparing left hand sides (LHSs) of (6) and (11) at the welfare maximizing 
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2 Though, in our analysis, we consider the number of firms as a continuous variable, while writing this 
proposition we keep in mind that the number of firms in reality takes integer values. Hence, we avoid 
writing the number of firms between 3 and 4 in the proposition. 4 
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, i.e., the number of firms in the free entry equilibrium is 
greater than the welfare maximizing number of firms, which implies that entry is 
excessive in this situation. 
















) 1 2 ( 2
) 1 (
, which implies that the number of firms in the free entry 
equilibrium is lower than the welfare maximizing number of firms. Hence, entry is 
insufficient in this situation. Q.E.D. 
 
  It follows from (6) and (11) that both the number of firms in the free entry 
equilibrium and the welfare maximizing number of firms increase with lower K . 
Hence, Proposition 1(i) suggests that entry is excessive if the cost of entry is not very 
high so that the welfare maximizing number of firm is at least 4. 
  The reason for the difference between our result and that of Ghosh and Morita 
(2007) with efficient bargaining is attributable to the different bargaining structures 
considered in these papers. In Ghosh and Morita (2007), the upstream agents bargain 
over both the input prices and the input quantities. The possibility of bargaining over 
the input quantities helps the upstream and the downstream agents to choose the input 
quantity in a way so that they can maximize their post-entry joint profits, which are 
divided between them by the input prices according to their bargaining powers. As the 
bargaining power of the downstream agent falls, it reduces the downstream agent’s 
share of the post-entry joint profit and therefore, it reduces its incentive for entry. If 
the bargaining power of the upstream agents is very high, it significantly reduces the 
downstream agents’ incentives for entry, and creates insufficient entry from the social 
point of view. 
In contrast, in our analysis, the upstream agents cannot determine the input 
quantities, and therefore, the joint profit maximizing role of the input quantities are 
not present here. Instead, we have the standard case of “double marginalization”, and 
the upstream agents must be careful about the effects of the input prices on the input 
demands. Hence, in our analysis, even if the upstream agents have full bargaining 
power, the post-entry profits of the downstream agents remain significant, thus 
providing significant incentives for entry. Further, higher competition in the product 
market helps to reduce the input price, thus reinforcing the “business stealing 
incentive” of the new entrant. Hence, if the cost of entry is not very high, the number 
of downstream firms entering the industry is not very small, and the equilibrium input 
price is not very high. In this situation, significant business stealing incentive remains 
for the new entrant, thus creating excessive entry for not very high entry costs. If the 
entry cost is very high, the number firms entering the market is small, and therefore, 
the equilibrium input price is very high, which, in turn, reduces the business stealing 
incentive significantly and creates insufficient entry for high entry costs.  
We have shown excessive entry with full bargaining power of the upstream 
agents. However, it must be clear that as the bargaining power of the upstream agents 5 
 
falls, it reduces the equilibrium input price for a given number of downstream agents, 
thus increasing the incentive for entry by raising the post-entry profits of the 
downstream agents. Hence, the case of excessive entry increases with lower 
bargaining power of the upstream agents. On the extreme case of no bargaining power 
of the upstream agents, our analysis coincides with the previous works on excessive 




Using a linear demand curve, we show that excessive entry rather than insufficient 
entry is quite common under a right-to-manage model. Unless the cost of entry is very 
high, entry is socially excessive. Thus, this note shows the role of the entry cost in 
determining the excessive or insufficient entry under a right-to-manage model, thus 
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